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lessons from the crisis for Latin 
America and the Caribbean
Filipa Correia, Luis Felipe Jiménez and Sandra Manuelito
The analysis of the financial crisis that broke out in the United States 
in mid-2008 gave rise to a vigorous debate about the role of financial 
regulation and oversight. The present article briefly analyses the crisis with 
a particular emphasis on these subjects, with the goal of suggesting some 
lessons that can be drawn from it for Latin America and the Caribbean. 
Accordingly, it describes the economic conditions and major changes that 
occurred in the financial system of the United States during the 1990s 
and the current decade, identifying the contribution of these factors to 
the crisis. The initial lessons drawn from this analysis are the need to: (i) 
consider macroprudential risk in the regulatory framework, (ii) reduce the 
procyclical bias of the system, (iii) widen the scope of regulation and (iv) 
deal with the conflicts of interest that prevent prompt and reliable disclosure 
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Historical evidence shows that crises originating in 
financial systems have been an inseparable part of the 
process of  economic development. The immediate 
effect of such crises has been to wreak considerable 
social and economic damage as a result of reduced 
activity and employment, increased poverty and 
additional burdens on the public exchequer, with 
significant effects on programmes aimed at improving 
social conditions for the lower-income population. 
Removing any possibility of financial crises occurring 
would mean greatly inhibiting risk-taking, which is 
inseparable from progress, innovation and growth. 
Consequently, the regulatory authority needs to strike 
a delicate balance between fostering those aspects of 
financial development that are positive for economic 
growth and controlling the build-up of risks that could 
lead to systemic crises.
Underlying this whole debate are four key aspects 
of financial systems: their high leverage makes them 
intrinsically fragile or vulnerable; their failure affects 
public faith (particularly in the case of institutions 
that take deposits from the public or issue securities 
in public markets, or both); they behave procyclically, 
with a tendency to expand in upturns and contract in 
downturns; and their influence is systemic, as the failure 
of certain major institutions may not only threaten 
the whole financial system but can (and usually does) 
also affect the rest of the economy.
In the case of banks and specialized institutions 
such as investment and mutual funds, debt-to-capital 
ratios are high and there is a maturity (and sometimes 
currency) mismatch between the loans and financial 
investments they make and the deposits they receive, 
which obviously makes them vulnerable to sudden 
market shifts. Nonetheless, risk-taking is essential to 
the term transformation function, with what are usually 
short- or medium-term financial savings being used to 
make longer-term loans and, particularly, long-term 
investments. Requiring an absolute match between 
the characteristics of financial saving and investment 
would result in inadequate levels of investment and 
economic development. Accordingly, risk-taking by 
some economic agents is an essential prerequisite 
for growth.
At the same time, if  the financial authorities 
allow and encourage the public to channel savings 
into investment through essentially fragile institutions 
they are implicitly backing those institutions and may 
compromise public faith. Consequently, the authorities 
must take steps to ensure that these savings are not 
affected by successive losses and that such events have 
as few negative consequences as possible when they do 
occur. This is particularly true in the case of small savers 
who, given the inevitable information asymmetries, are 
not in a position to inform themselves fully about the 
uses their money is being put to and the risks being 
taken on by financial institutions. Prudential solvency 
regulation is thus indispensable if  a balance is to be 
struck between the use of savings for growth and the 
preservation of public faith in the system.
This dilemma is compounded by certain features of 
financial systems and by the formation of expectations 
that systematically characterize the behaviour of 
savers, investors, borrowers and intermediaries, i.e., 
the market in general. For one thing, expectations 
of a boom tend to become self-fulfilling as they feed 
back into behaviour, while negative events create 
recessionary expectations and behaviour. The same 
happens with risk tolerance, which increases during 
booms and diminishes during recessions.
Meanwhile, the characteristics and behaviour 
of financial systems (unlike other organisms) mutate 
constantly as they innovate in search of  potential 
returns. Their innovativeness and their swiftness to 
exploit any advantage in unregulated segments make 
them similar to a virus that is capable of adapting to 
its environment, with all the benefits and costs and 
the positive and negative externalities for growth and 
stability that ensue from this. As a result, regulation 
will inevitably lag behind changes in the financial 
system. For the reasons given earlier, though, it cannot 
be abandoned but must be continually renewed.
The influence of practically all the characteristics 
mentioned above can be detected in the origins of the 
current crisis in the financial system of the United 
States, along with factors connected to the economic 
cycle and serious supervisory failings. There now 
I
introduction
  The authors are grateful for the comments made on an earlier 
version of this article by Osvaldo Kacef, Director of the eclac 
Economic Development Division, and for those made on the 
present version by an anonymous referee.
9FinAnCiAL rEGuLAtion AnD ovErsiGht: LEssons FroM thE Crisis For LAtin AMEriCA 
AnD thE CARIBBEAn  •  FILIPA CoRREIA, LuIs FELIPE JIMénEz AnD sAnDRA MAnuELIto
C E P A L  R E V I E W  9 9  •  D E C E M B E R  2 0 0 9
follows a brief analysis of how macroeconomic events 
in the United States helped to create the conditions 
for this crisis and what role the financial sector has 
played. After that, the crisis will be considered from 
the perspective of financial systems in Latin America 
and the Caribbean to see what main lessons can be 
learned for financial regulation and oversight in the 
region. Because this debate is only just beginning, 
the intention of the authors is not so much to arrive 
at definite conclusions as to point out the areas on 
which they believe the coming regulatory reforms in 
these countries ought to focus.
II
Elements for the analysis of the current
financial crisis
Examination of the current financial crisis reveals 
a combination of different factors. First, economic 
conditions in the United States are of  particular 
importance. Beginning in the late 1980s, the country 
went through a period of  high economic growth, 
interrupted only in 1991 with the Gulf War and in 
2001 with the fall in the technology stocks index 
(nasdaq), and then as a result of  the economic 
upheaval caused by the attack on the Twin Towers 
of 11 September 2001.
During the 1990s, economic activity expanded 
on the basis of higher investment and rapidly rising 
consumption. This dynamism was sustained by a 
large increase in liquidity in the money market and 
a significant reduction in interest rates. From 2001 
onward, rapid growth in private-sector demand was 
combined with a swelling fiscal deficit, the result of 
higher public spending due to burgeoning military 
outlays and the economic stimulus programme.1
The steady growth of domestic demand translated 
in turn into a large rise in goods and services imports, 
taking the balance-of-payments current-account 
deficit from 1.7% of gdp in 1998 to 6.2% in 2006.2 
The financing needs of the United States led to strong 
growth in sales of Treasury securities and thence in 
the quantity of international reserves invested in these 
instruments by emerging countries. In 2007, about 
half  of all investment in these securities was held by 
non-residents.3
1 See Manuelito, Correia and Jiménez (2009) for a more detailed 
discussion of  the macroeconomic factors that influenced the 
crisis. In particular, see Machinea (2009) on the role played by 
monetary policy.
2 The current-account deficit fell back to 5.2% and 4.7% of gdp 
in 2007 and 2008, respectively.
3 Other interpretations of the origins of the crisis emphasize the 
Falling interest rates, readily available funding 
and steady economic expansion created a climate 
of  optimism which fed back into strong growth in 
both consumer and mortgage lending by banks. 
House prices rose vigorously on the back of strongly 
expanding demand, driven in turn by the easier 
availability of  credit.4 A circle was thus created in 
which more lending generated more demand, which 
in turn drove lending steadily higher. Interest rate cuts 
spread to other economies, resulting in leading stock 
market indices and house prices behaving similarly 
in a number of  the world’s capitals.5
A second factor was that major changes were afoot 
in the workings of the United States financial system: 
(i) the growing importance of  derivatives markets 
from 2000 onward; (ii) financial sector deregulation 
in the 1990s and 2000s; (iii) the appearance of the 
“originate and distribute” model and new derivative 
instruments; and (iv) the strong growth of subprime 
mortgage lending.
In the United States, very large sums came to be 
traded through derivatives contracts. These totalled 
US$ 182 trillion in the second quarter of 2008, the 
equivalent of 12 times the country’s gdp (occ, 2008). 
Worldwide, the total value of over-the-counter (otc) 
derivatives contracts rose from US$ 95.2 trillion 
in December 2000 to US$ 683.725 trillion by the 
end of  the first half  of  2008.6 Within this overall 
role of  the United States dollar as a reserve currency and the 
reaction of the country’s economy and economic authorities to 
the build-up of reserves by emerging economies. See Greenwald 
and Stiglitz (2008) and Financial Services Authority (2009).
4 The S&P/Case-Schiller house price index rose by 85% between 
January 2000 and December 2007.
5 London and Madrid are good examples.
6 Over-the-counter derivatives are traded through financial 
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increase, the value of credit default swaps underwent 
an extraordinary rise from US$ 6.396 trillion to
US$ 57.894 trillion. Their share of all outstanding 
otc derivatives contracts by value worldwide rose 
from 2% to 10% (see table 1).
Where financial sector deregulation is concerned, 
in the early 1990s the United States Federal Reserve 
System allowed commercial banks to pay interest on 
current accounts. This meant that these banks could 
start competing with savings and loan institutions as 
deposit-takers, but it also meant that the latter would 
have to start taking on the same risks as commercial 
banks. In the late 1990s, the Federal Reserve abolished 
the requirement for banks to specialize as commercial 
banks, investment banks or saving banks, allowing 
them to carry out all kinds of  operations. While this 
measure meant that the country’s financial system 
could carry on developing, it was taken in a context 
where banks had to learn about businesses of  which 
they had no previous experience. Lastly, financial 
deregulation limited the power of the Federal Reserve 
to control the credit supply, leaving the federal funds 
rate and the discount rate as the sole monetary 
policy instruments.
In recent years, there has also been an important 
change in the way the financial market works, away 
from an “originate and own” model and towards 
an “originate to distribute” one. The new business 
model allowed the lending process to be split into 
institutions and are usually unstandardized, unlike those traded 
on organized markets (chiefly stock markets), which are generally 
standardized.
different components or phases, from origination 
to ultimate financing (Bernanke, 2008). Thus, bank 
lending operations shifted their focus more towards 
the assessment of risk transfer and arbitrage.
This business model emerged in a context of 
strong growth in credit default swaps over a short 
period. These instruments were originally conceived 
as mechanisms for dispersing credit risk across the 
financial system. The idea was that they would 
increase liquidity and transparency in that market 
and foster the emergence of new risk management 
tools (Kroszner, 2007) so that the financing of credit 
could be separated from the allocation of the risk 
associated with it, a characteristic that made them 
very attractive to financial institutions. In this context, 
these securities encouraged greater risk-taking as they 
opened the way to operations that were not profitable 
before they existed, the assumption being that, while 
operations might be riskier, the individual risk taken 
on by financial agents would potentially be lower, as 
the risk would be spread more widely in the financial 
market (Eichengreen, 2008; Financial Services 
Authority, 2009). It was recognized, however, that 
the complexity of some of these instruments made 
it hard to value and measure them and to manage 
the associated risk.
Consequently, there was a move away from a 
system in which financial institutions granted loans 
(they continued to generate lending), evaluated the 
risk of lending operations and then diversified that 
risk by transferring some of it to other institutions or 
through portfolio management operations, to a system 
in which they did not retain any of the risk associated 
with their own lending. Thus, the traditional banking 
TABLE 1
over-the-counter (otc) financial derivatives: amounts outstanding worldwide, 
by derivative type
(Billions of dollars, end of period)
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 June 2008
Currency 15 666 16 748 18 469 24 475 29 289 31 364 40 239 56 238 62 983
Interest rate 64 668 77 568 101 699 141 991 190 502 211 970 291 582 393 138 458 304
Equity-linked bond 1 891 1 881 2 309 3 787 4 385 5 793 7 488 8 469 10 177
Commodity 662 598 923 1 406 1 443 5 434 7 115 8 455 13 229
Credit default swaps … … … … 6 396 13 908 28 650 57 894 57 325
Unassigned 12 313 14 384 18 337 25 508 25 879 29 199 39 740 71 146 81 708
 
Total 95 200 111 179 141 737 197 167 257 894 297 668 414 845 595 341 683 725
Source: Bank for International Settlements (bis), Quarterly Review, various issues.
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system became one whose business model was based 
on trading risk in the financial market, so that risk 
itself  became a source of extra profits for financial 
institutions as it was sold on to investors willing 
to diversify their portfolios by accepting exposure 
to sectors and risk-return profiles not previously 
available to them.
In this context, the banks no longer had incentives 
to assess, mitigate and protect themselves against the 
risk associated with operations of this type, as they 
were transferring it to buyers of  securities in the 
form of collateralized debt obligations (cdos). These 
were created through structured investment vehicles 
(sivs) which, being separate from the banks, enabled 
the latter to keep these operations off  their balance 
sheets. This made it possible to evade the solvency and 
liquidity regulations and risk controls applicable to 
banks and meant there were still fewer incentives to 
measure risk properly.7 The result was that the great 
majority of those purchasing these securities did not 
know exactly what they were buying.
The subprime market had also developed strongly 
over the previous years, particularly for mortgages, 
on the basis of  high property prices. This market 
consists of loans granted to individuals who have a 
higher credit risk (or are not considered creditworthy) 
and would only receive loans at higher interest rates 
and on stricter terms if  the usual internal risk control 
standards and procedures were applied.
Given the opportunity to securitize such loans 
and transfer the risk associated with them to other 
agents in the market, financial institutions bundled 
these mortgages into securities that were then traded 
in the market as high-quality credit instruments, since 
the risks were supposedly diversified and backed by 
real-estate collateral. In addition, there was a general 
feeling of optimism about the performance of the 
economy, so that property assets became overvalued 
and the possibility of price falls was underestimated. 
Nonetheless, these new instruments included bundles 
of mortgages with different levels of risk, and there 
was significant correlation between them as regarded 
the likelihood of default. In short, there were serious 
shortcomings in risk measurement and the risk of 
default was underestimated or simply unknown 
(Bernanke, 2008; Rudolph and Scholz, 2008).
7 Off-balance-sheet operations, as the name implies, are not 
recorded among either the assets or the liabilities of the financial 
institutions originating them.
A number of  factors have been blamed for 
the failures of  risk measurement, reporting and 
management. First, these instruments were relatively 
new, which meant that the statistical information 
available on their behaviour covered only periods of 
economic growth. Second, the stress tests applied 
to the models were not extreme enough, so that 
liquidity requirements were inadequate for periods of 
difficulty (Bazinger, 2008). Again, the pricing models 
for these assets worked on the premise that markets 
would provide continuous price signals and maintain 
a degree of liquidity, which in the event proved to 
be wrong (Eichengreen, 2008; Financial Services 
Authority, 2009). All this was compounded by an 
extraordinary lack of  transparency in the system, 
with inadequate reporting of risks incurred, which 
made it very difficult to know how much risk had 
actually been taken on by financial institutions and 
investors in instruments of this kind. The situation 
was further complicated by the incentive schemes 
implemented by upper management and the role of 
risk rating agencies and of the potential conflicts of 
interest arising from their work.
In this context of strong credit growth, inadequate 
regulation and poorly measured or simply unquantified 
risk, alarm bells began to sound in the United States 
financial system in mid-2007. The unemployment rate, 
after dropping substantially, began a steady climb. 
The heavy borrowings of families and the perception 
that people were having difficulties meeting the 
repayments on their mortgages weighed on the prices 
of securities based on these. Rising mortgage arrears 
in the subprime market led to an increase in judicial 
auctions of mortgaged homes. As lower demand for 
housing met an abundant supply, property prices began 
to fall. The vicious circle that had artificially inflated 
property values, financial wealth, credit and profit 
growth and the balance sheets of numerous financial 
institutions (banks and non-banks) was abruptly halted 
and then reversed, triggering the crisis.
This sequence of events showed that the banks had 
been lending on the basis of overinflated asset prices. 
Consequently, when the values of bank assets (loans 
and financial investments) began to collapse, capital 
also diminished and in many cases disappeared because 
of extremely high levels of leverage, particularly in the 
case of investment banking, an activity that virtually 
ceased to exist in the space of less than a month. A 
number of  the institutions that stood behind the 
affected mortgages had large market shares and were 
bailed out (Bear Stearns, aig, Fannie Mae, Freddie 
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Mac). These successive rescues fuelled speculative 
behaviour and the authorities judged that there had 
been a worsening of  moral hazard on the part of 
failing institutions. Consequently, following arduous 
negotiations to prevent the collapse of the investment 
bank Lehman Brothers, they changed tack and decided 
not to intervene. This precipitated the failure of the 
bank and unleashed panic, as expectations of  an 
implicit bail-out guarantee vanished.
The strong likelihood of  contagion and 
bankruptcies due to the loss of  confidence and 
uncertainty associated with the spread of the subprime 
mortgage crisis eventually materialized in late September 
2008. As a result, liquidity contracted in international 
markets, interest rates in the interbank market rose 
sharply and there was a general deflation in the prices 
of financial assets in international markets over the 
early weeks of October, with large falls in share and 
commodity prices. Not knowing the risk exposure of 
other financial agents, banks preferred not to lend, 
and this led to a severe liquidity drought in national 
and international interbank markets and thence to the 
credit crunch. At this point the financial crisis finally 
reached the real sector and developing countries.
III
some lessons of the current financial crisis
for Latin America and the Caribbean
The historical evidence, and an appreciation of the 
essential fragility of financial systems, indicate that 
crises originating in these are an inseparable part 
of  growth. To abolish them completely it would 
be necessary to inhibit the risk-taking that is an 
essential part of progress, innovation and economic 
development. What lessons for Latin America and 
the Caribbean can be drawn from this crisis to reduce 
the frequency with which they occur and limit the 
fall-out when they do?
The region’s financial systems are by no means 
as sophisticated as those of the countries where the 
current crisis originated, and bank penetration is 
considerably lower. In particular, the complex system 
for raising and allocating financing that is characteristic 
of developed countries, with a multiplicity of agents 
intervening between savers or financial investors and 
the actual investor or final borrower, is not a feature 
of  our countries, although some components are 
present in certain cases (Chile, Brazil, Mexico and, to 
a lesser extent, Colombia) (see figure 1). Thus, capital 
markets, and the market segments in which derivatives 
and securitized instruments in particular are traded, 
are underdeveloped or non-existent.
This generalization is not altogether applicable 
to countries where institutional investors (such as 
pension funds and life insurance companies) have 
developed significantly as a result of pension system 
reforms. The development of  credit securitization 
firms, for their part, is very recent.
The region’s financial system therefore continues 
to be dominated by commercial banks that retain 
in their portfolios a substantial portion of the risk 
from their investments and employ a funding system 
based essentially on deposits, standardized bond 
issues and, in some cases, access to resources from 
the international financial system. Although it may 
perhaps result in a lower degree of efficiency when 
it comes to turning saving potential into financing 
for growth and development, this lesser complexity 
has helped to ensure that under present conditions 
the region’s financial systems have not suffered to 
anything like the same extent from the symptoms 
and failings that led to the current crisis in a number 
of  developed-country markets. Probably the most 
palpable direct impact on the region’s banks arose in 
cases where their funding relied heavily on short-term 
financing from abroad.
Meanwhile, there has been clear progress with 
banking regulation, particularly since the adoption 
by several countries of the recommendations of the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, known 
as the Basel I Agreement, although implementation 
has been patchy.8 This progress is partly due to the 
past experience of financial crises in Latin America 
and the desire to avoid the high costs these entailed, 
8 The United States has not adhered fully to these 
recommendations.
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in terms both of lost economic activity and of the 
large amounts of fiscal resources committed to bank 
rescue operations. Thus, in relation to earlier crises, 
the region’s banking institutions find themselves in 
principle on a better footing of solvency to deal with 
fluctuations in economic activity.
Nonetheless, the emphasis of regulation is on 
capital adequacy, loss provisions and rules on liquidity 
and currency and maturity mismatches for individual 
banks. This emphasis does not address the very 
aspects that have characteristically underlain systemic 
crises, including the present one: the steady growth 
of overall lending and constantly rising asset prices, 
and the concentration of  credit in certain market 
segments, all of which is indicative of an enormous 
build-up of systemic risk.9 Recently, both the Basel 
Committee itself  and the authorities responsible 
for the stability of  national financial systems have 
brought out proposals to address just these aggregate 
issues underlying systemic financial crises, thereby 
opening up the new field of macrofinancial prudential 
9  By systemic risk we mean the likelihood that when a financial 
institution encounters difficulties or fails, there will be severe 
disruption to markets and payment systems leading to the failure 
of other institutions, both in the financial world and in the rest 
of the economy. The systemic importance of an institution is not 
determined solely by its size (e.g., market share) but also depends 
on the role it performs, for example, in the payment chain or in 
the lending process as a whole.
regulation.10 Implicitly or explicitly, different regulatory 
and government authorities have accepted the need 
for a new approach.11 Nonetheless, there is still a 
need to work out how best to implement the kind of 
financial indicators this type of regulation requires and 
the rules to be applied in cases where a sector poses a 
risk to the system as a whole even though individual 
institutions are within their risk limits.
Where the region is concerned, four areas of 
debate are yielding tentative but important results: 
(i) macroprudential measures for crisis prevention, 
(ii) improved prudential regulation of  financial 
institutions to make their behaviour less procyclical, 
(iii) broader scope for regulation and (iv) certain 
conflicts of interest that interfere with the timely and 
reliable disclosure of the levels of risk taken on by 
financial institutions.
1. Macroprudential measures
A number of financial crises have been preceded by 
strong credit growth and steady increases in certain 
asset prices, and this has given rise to a debate about 
the role of monetary policy when there are growing 
signs that a bubble is forming. The central issue has 
been the extent to which monetary policy ought to be 
10 See, for example, White (2008) and Borio and Shim (2007).
11 See Financial Services Authority (2009) and the proposals of the 
United States government for reforming financial regulation.
FIGURE 1
Latin America: domestic lending to the private sector
(Year-end balances as a percentage of gdp)
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oriented towards deactivating the mechanisms driving 
the asset price boom and the manner in which this 
new policy orientation is to be integrated with the 
conventional goals of maintaining employment and 
controlling inflation.12 Some authors have argued 
that one situation which would justify intervention 
by the monetary authority in the asset market is when 
there is evidence of reciprocal causality and feedback 
between asset price booms and lending, but that even 
so monetary policy ought to intervene only if  this 
vicious circle affects the goals of controlling inflation 
and achieving a sustainable level of  employment. 
This approach considers that the goal of preventing 
financial market developments from turning into 
systemic crises is better suited to the characteristics 
and tools of regulatory policy (Mishkin, 2008).
Because Latin America and the Caribbean have 
less sophisticated financial systems, systemic financial 
crises there have usually had different origins to those 
identified in the case of more highly developed financial 
systems, so that the debate has to be approached from 
a different perspective. The type of credit growth that 
has led to financial crises in the region has more to do 
with persistent macroeconomic imbalances leading 
to excessive expenditure (both public and private), 
inconsistencies between macroeconomic policies and 
exchange-rate regimes, and permissive regulatory 
regimes that have opened the way to excessive risk-
taking. All this has sometimes been compounded by 
lax lending to customers connected to the ownership 
or management of banks.
In a number of  cases, lending growth has 
originated in large inflows of  external capital in a 
context of fixed exchange-rate regimes and high local 
interest rates. The implicit guarantees provided by an 
exchange-rate regime of this type can lead to external 
overborrowing by banks and other agents and thus to 
a build-up of currency mismatches and overspending 
that places pressure on domestic prices and leads to 
an overvalued real exchange rate and a deteriorating 
external balance, ultimately forcing devaluation. From 
then on, events follow much the same course as in a 
crisis induced by an asset price bubble: devaluation 
exposes the mismatches between the values of assets 
and liabilities held by banks and other agents who were 
12 A number of the region’s countries have tended to make price 
stability the only goal of monetary policy. According to Mishkin 
(2008), the United States Congress has laid down a threefold 
mandate for monetary policy: price stability combined with full 
employment and moderate long-term interest rates.
relying on the guarantee provided by the exchange-rate 
regime, and the result is bankruptcies among financial 
institutions and a credit crunch.
Associated with this, although without necessarily 
reflecting macroeconomic imbalances, the exposure of 
local banks to the risk of sharp fluctuations in external 
liquidity because of maturity or currency mismatches 
between their assets and liabilities has also been a 
source of financial crises and has exacerbated crises 
originating in domestic imbalances, external shocks 
or both (see figure 2).
Again, just as with the current crisis, the 
experience of the region and other developing countries 
suggests that one harbinger of an imminent crisis is a 
significant concentration of credit in certain segments 
of the market, particularly property (residential and 
commercial), leading to overinvestment in these 
sectors and thus sowing the seeds of collapse there 
and among banks. This behaviour is partly explained 
by the inability of individual financial agents to assess 
the market risks caused by credit concentration at 
an aggregate level, as their interest is focused almost 
exclusively on the risks of their own lending portfolios. 
Underlying this is excessive optimism about their 
ability to unwind portfolio positions if  difficulties 
arise, as discussed further on.
Credit concentration has three further dimensions 
that have been the source of  many systemic crises 
and bankruptcies among financial institutions. The 
first is the existence of banking institutions that are 
too big for the economies they operate in and that 
can represent a systemic threat if  they go bankrupt. 
The second threat of this type arises when banks are 
highly exposed to the risk of certain major customers 
going bankrupt. Lastly, crises have also been caused in 
Latin America by lending to related parties involved 
in the ownership or management of banks. Policies 
to prevent crises of  this type are obviously not to 
be sought in the monetary sphere in the narrowest 
sense of the term. Rather, there will need to be some 
combination of policies to correct macroeconomic 
imbalances, establish prudential or regulatory measures 
and promote market competition.
Thus, a number of  countries have opted for 
exchange-rate regimes that do not provide implicit 
guarantees, so that agents will internalize the risk of 
their external exposure and unsustainable spending 
behaviour thus be prevented. This is perhaps one of 
the most important measures for preventing crises 
originating in excessive optimism about the availability 
of  external resources. It may not be an adequate 
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deterrent, however, in situations of  great external 
liquidity and low interest rates in the leading global 
financial centres, as seen until recently. Greater risk 
tolerance, and a possible relaxation of  regulatory 
rigour during periods of strong economic growth and 
global liquidity, may cause agents to underestimate 
the likelihood of favourable external circumstances 
reversing.13
Thus, while the exchange-rate regime may not 
provide implicit guarantees, the external overexposure of 
banks, firms and other agents can rise to unsustainable 
or risky levels. The responsibility of  the relevant 
regulatory authority (the banking regulator or the 
regulator responsible for supervising institutions that 
carry out public securities offerings) consists in this 
case in making the risks incurred by these institutions 
more transparent, both individually and for the system 
as a whole, and in creating awareness of  risk, for 
example by requiring that periodic reporting should 
include the results of stress tests that use recognized 
methodologies to estimate the effects on assets and 
the liquidity and capital needs that would arise in less 
favourable scenarios.
13 Borio and Zhu (2008) explore the relationship between the 
economic cycle and risk perception and argue that this procyclical 
relationship has recently played a greater role in the genesis of 
financial crises.
Again, recognition that sustained credit growth 
has been one of the factors behind financial crises has 
recently led to a new interest in measures to oversee 
financial institutions’ global leverage, on top of capital 
requirement regulations. These are discussed in the 
next section.
A sustained increase in credit concentration in 
particular market segments increases systemic risk 
because, even if  each individual institution can show 
levels of liquidity and provisions that are apparently 
sufficient to cover expected losses, they may not be 
adequate for all of  them as a group since there is 
an underlying fallacy of composition. In the event 
of a shock in that market, a number of institutions 
will require liquidity simultaneously to meet their 
liabilities (such as deposits). If  this increased demand 
for liquidity also leads banks to sell off  some of 
their investments in other instruments and restrict 
their lending, losses of value could spread to other 
market segments, making the original liquidity and 
provision levels inadequate. It is therefore advisable 
for the regulator to carry out stress tests for the market 
as a whole based on total exposures and, when this 
indicates a level of potential liquidity demand that 
is considered high, to use prudential rules to restrain 
lending growth in that market.
Prudential rules have recognized the risk 
posed to financial institutions by exposure to large 
FIGURE 2
External liabilities of emerging-market banks towards banks reporting to the Bank for 
international settlements (bis)
(Millions of dollars)
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borrowers and related parties involved with their 
ownership, management or both, and quantitative 
limits have accordingly been placed on such lending. 
Unfortunately, no empirical diagnosis is available to 
show how effectively these rules or other risk reduction 
provisions have been applied in Latin America. In 
any event, much remains to be done in terms of 
periodic public reporting of the risk level embodied 
in the portfolios of  banks and other systemically 
important institutions. This is a serious deficiency, 
given that the ability of financial systems to mobilize 
savings effectively depends critically on agents’ 
knowledge of the risks incurred when these savings 
are deposited with banks or when securities issued 
by them (bonds and shares or other instruments) are 
purchased. Furthermore, this transparency acts as an 
extra discipline for banks, encouraging more cautious 
lending behaviour on penalty of their depositors and 
investors losing confidence in them if  they take very 
risky positions. Thus, prompt, regular and reliable 
reporting is the least that can be asked both in this 
case and for all portfolio risks so that depositors and 
investors are aware of the risks they are taking on, 
with market discipline thereby promoted.
Lastly, pro-competition rules and those relating 
to the granting and withdrawal of banking licences, 
the entry of foreign banks and mergers of financial 
institutions, among other regulations dealing with 
market concentration, are some of the other aspects 
that are underdeveloped in the region when viewed 
from the standpoint of financial system stability.
2. reducing the procyclicality of the financial 
system
The procyclical behaviour of financial systems has been 
widely acknowledged as both a cause of crises and a 
factor aggravating them. There are two main orders 
of  problems for regulators here: the risk attitudes 
of  market agents over the cycle and the extent to 
which certain prudential rules might accentuate the 
procyclical character of the system.14
Financial markets are governed by evolving 
expectations of future returns, which have proved too 
optimistic in upturns as agents’ risk tolerance increases 
and too pessimistic and risk-averse during market 
downturns. Consequently, lending and liquidity tend 
14  See, for example, Rochet (2008), Bikker and Metzemakers (2002), 
Gordy and Howells (2004) and Taylor and Goodhart (2004).
to behave in ways that heighten cyclical fluctuations.15 
Although other factors undoubtedly come into play, 
one of the areas of failure is the risk perception of 
agents. As has often been pointed out, by failing to 
take due account of the systemic effects of excessive 
credit growth and the eventual bursting of the bubble, 
agents overestimate their ability to change their risk 
exposures (i.e., their ability to transfer risk to others 
before the bubble bursts) and underestimate their 
liquidity needs, as they do not consider systemic crisis 
scenarios. The fallacy of composition is obvious and 
is manifested in deep falls in asset prices and intense 
demand for liquidity when a crisis breaks out. In turn, 
the effects of rising risk tolerance during upturns are 
aggravated by incentive systems that reward short-term 
profitability, encouraging emulation of risky behaviour 
and tending to undermine corporate governance as 
internal controls that ought theoretically to restrain 
risk-taking are relaxed.
Particular regulations that may heighten 
procyclicality include requirements for risk to be 
measured on the basis of  short-term portfolio 
behaviour for the purpose of loss provisioning, and 
application of the ratio between effective capital and 
risk-weighted assets as a measure to ensure regulatory 
capital adequacy.16, 17
Under the rules applied in a number of  the 
region’s countries, provisions (which are imputed costs 
affecting the result or yield of the portfolio) must be 
set aside in accordance with the performance category 
lending falls into. For example, a loan that has been 
non-performing for more than a given period of time 
must be set down as irrecoverable and provisioned for, 
with a write-down of 100% of its value. Conversely, 
loans with no current or previous arrears do not 
generate additional portfolio costs, i.e., expected 
losses, and so are not provisioned for. Of  course, 
there are intermediate credit performance categories 
giving rise to provisions of between 0% and 100% 
15  In fairness, it should be pointed out that this euphoric/depressive 
behaviour does not only affect private agents. The behaviour 
of public spending and wage expectations also tends to display 
procyclical characteristics.
16 Effective capital is defined as capital and reserves + junior 
(subordinated) bonds + provisions – investment in companies – 
capital allocated to subsidiaries abroad. The denominator is the 
weighted sum of all assets. The weightings are fixed and are defined 
(in Basel I) by general risk categories, ranging from 0% for risk-free 
liquid assets to 100% for risky and less liquid assets.
17 The literature generally distinguishes between this regulatory 
capital and “economic” capital. The latter is the level of capital 
actually held by banks, which for precautionary reasons usually 
exceeds the capital amount laid down by the regulations.
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of the loan amount, with another factor sometimes 
being the quality and amount of collateral, as this 
affects the prospects of recovery. In the vast majority 
of cases these provisions are established on the basis 
of the observed (rather than expected) behaviour of 
the portfolio, and since the evidence plainly shows 
that credit performance is procyclical, they tend to 
fall during upturns and rise in downturns.18 Thus, 
because these provisions are meant to reflect portfolio 
costs incurred (they do not relate to expected costs, for 
example), bank lending is more profitable in upturns. 
To the extent that the likelihood of losses over the full 
cycle is underestimated at this stage, medium- or long-
run returns are overestimated and, given an incentive 
system based on short-term indicators, this reinforces 
expansionary behaviour and vice-versa. In summary, 
the cost of generating loans (including provisions) 
falls in the upswings of the cycle, which spurs lending 
growth, but rises during the downswings, eventually 
triggering a credit crunch.
Different analyses have pointed out that the 
proposed new capital accord currently under discussion 
(Basel II) would tend to accentuate this procyclical 
behaviour yet further, as it links regulatory capital 
more closely to portfolio risk. Other analysts, while 
accepting this possibility, argue that under the version 
of the accord that allows banks to use their own credit 
risk models to determine their capital requirements, 
these would tend to reflect risk behaviour better 
over the whole cycle. In the light of experience with 
the behaviour of risk tolerance and of the internal 
controls that were supposed to prevent overexposure 
in the run-up to the present crisis, this claim looks 
more like wishful thinking than a realistic analysis, 
particularly in the case of new instruments whose risk 
characteristics are insufficiently known.
The current crisis revealed the crucial role played 
by liquidity, both in the build-up of systemic risk and 
in the outbreak of the crisis and its transmission to 
the rest of the economy. During the phase of plentiful 
liquidity, agents could take positions and liquidate 
them fairly easily, which allowed them to take on larger 
maturity risks (using short-term funding to maintain 
long-term positions) in the confidence that if  greater 
liquidity were needed, it could easily be obtained by 
18 There may be some time lag between the rise of portfolio risk 
and provisions, as banks could decide to hold excess provisions 
temporarily. This entails a cost, however.
selling assets into a large, fluid market.19, 20 Once 
again, the fallacy of composition became apparent in 
the critical phase and a number of markets that were 
formerly liquid virtually disappeared in a very short 
time or continued to operate at very low levels, which 
exacerbated uncertainty and the credit crunch globally. 
In other words, this episode revealed the procyclical 
and systemic character of market liquidity.
There have been a variety of proposals for dealing 
with the procyclicality of certain regulations, the best-
known being the “statistical provisioning” introduced 
by Spain in 2000. This relies on calculations of the 
likelihood of loan default based on typical behaviour 
over the full cycle. Thus, in the early stages of a lending 
boom, when default rates are typically below the 
average for the full cycle, the lending cost represented 
by provisions remains constant rather than falling, 
so that there is no extra stimulus for lending growth. 
Similarly, this cost remains constant in the downswings 
of the cycle instead of rising, which helps to prevent 
an excessive contraction of credit.
Objections have been made to this system, but in 
any event its effectiveness in reducing the procyclicality 
of lending can only be assessed once the present crisis 
is over.21 An initial observation is that, while it may 
have done something to reduce this procyclicality, 
it does not appear to have been sufficient to prevent 
overlending, given that the mortgage segment of  the 
country’s financial system has also been affected by 
developments similar to those underlying the crisis 
in other developed countries. The applicability of 
19  See Financial Services Authority (2009), which presents evidence 
of the significant increase in such term transformation in the run-
up to the crisis.
20  In the literature, this strategy for obtaining liquidity is called 
“liquidity through marketability” to differentiate it from the 
approach that emphasizes the need for asset portfolios to include 
safe and highly liquid financial securities such as government bonds 
or securities issued by the central bank.
21  Criticisms are based on accounting, tax and corporate governance 
considerations. From the accounting point of view, provisions are 
charges against costs caused (although not yet paid) in the present. 
Provisions based on the likelihood of  future non-payment are 
charges for costs that have not yet arisen, and so should not be 
made. From the standpoint of the tax authority, the reduction in 
taxable profits that results from setting aside provisions against 
future non-payments is a device that opens the way to intertemporal 
tax arbitrage which reduces the present value of tax payment flows. 
Lastly, from the point of  view of  shareholders, particularly if  
ownership if  very dispersed, bringing forward provisions reduces 
dividends and provides a source of funding that managers can use 
to implement expansion plans without having to raise financing 
from the market, weakening the discipline this might impose on 
the institution.
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this measure to the region still has to be evaluated, 
as it has shorter and more variable cycles than 
developed countries.
With regard to capital, proposals are more 
diverse. To reduce the procyclicality of the current 
capital requirement, it has been proposed that current 
regulations should be supplemented by a leverage 
limit based on the ratio between core or Tier 1 capital 
and gross assets, i.e., loans, but this time without risk 
weighting (Financial Services Authority, 2009).22 
It is argued that this is a more robust measure of a 
financial institution’s solvency and at the same time 
less procyclical than the criterion currently applied 
(the ratio between capital and risk-weighted assets). 
For one thing, the riskiness of many assets rises in 
situations of crisis; consequently, to restore the ratio 
between capital and weighted assets the former 
must be increased or the latter diminished. Because 
capital is hard to come by in a crisis, the result is a 
reduction in assets, i.e., a procyclical credit crunch. The 
supplementary measure proposed, because it discards 
risk weightings and requires a certain percentage of 
capital for all assets, could translate firstly into a higher 
capital requirement (thus strengthening solvency) and 
secondly into reduced risk sensitivity, thus making 
the regulations less procyclical.
Before the Basil II Accord was applied by a number 
of the region’s countries, regulatory capital was often 
determined by employing concepts similar to the 
measure proposed. This did not completely eliminate 
procyclical lending behaviour, however, which shows 
that progress in this area will need to come from a 
range of policies, some of them regulatory in nature, 
others relating to the macroeconomic regime.
A second proposal is for dynamic capital 
requirements, rising during phases of lending growth 
and falling during phases of  contraction. This is 
a way of acknowledging that it is during the early 
phases that credit risk accumulates, even if  it actually 
materializes in the downturns of the cycle. Dynamic 
capital requirements would reduce procyclical lending 
behaviour because the cost of generating credit (raising 
new capital) would rise in the upswings of the cycle. 
Some regard this proposal as highly dangerous, as it 
is precisely during downswings that a high level of 
bank capitalization is required, as was demonstrated 
22  Core capital or Tier 1 capital is the portion of regulatory capital 
provided directly by shareholders. An approximation to this (since 
definitions vary from case to case) is effective capital, excluding 
junior (subordinated) bonds. 
by the solution to the banking emergency in Europe 
and the United States. Otherwise, confidence in system 
solvency deteriorates severely, potentially leading to 
paralysis, as happened in the present crisis.
A third set of proposals aims to deal with the 
uncertainty affecting bank solvency at times of crisis, 
which exacerbates so-called “counterparty risks” or 
credit risks.23 The goal is to reduce that uncertainty 
and thereby moderate or prevent a disorderly credit 
crunch at the end of the cycle. Some have suggested 
establishing capital insurance, so that when particular 
events indicative of a risk of financial crisis occur, 
the capital available to banks to cope with losses is 
supplemented by this insurance; thus, the obligation 
to comply with capital requirements would not result 
in a procyclical credit crunch (Kashyap, Rajan and 
Stein, 2008).
The authors of  this proposal have themselves 
formulated observations similar to those made on the 
contingent credit lines of the International Monetary 
Fund (imf) at the time they were established. An 
arrangement of this type ought to be made compulsory 
for all banks of systemic importance, since none would 
wish to be the first to adopt it given that it could 
be interpreted by the market as a sign of weakness. 
Insurance, meanwhile, could give rise to moral 
hazard, increasing the likelihood of crisis. There is 
also the question of who would be the insurer, since 
the amount of resources needed in a systemic crisis 
can be large.
Lastly, the liquidity debate is only just beginning 
and regulation is expected to be even more important 
in this area than for capital, including measures to 
restrict term transformation by reducing maturity 
mismatches between assets and liabilities. While 
this has a cost in terms of the capacity to support 
long-term ventures, it offers the benefit of shoring 
up the stability of the financial system, with positive 
consequences for long-term growth.
In short, finding the best way to deal with 
procyclicality in the financial system remains an 
unresolved challenge in the world and the applicability 
of  proposals to the region needs to be carefully 
evaluated. This is also true of proposals for reviewing 
liquidity requirements that are aimed at preventing 
episodes in which disorderly liquidation of financial 
23  This risk particularly affects liquidity during crisis episodes and 
concerns the likelihood of default in interbank market operations 
and those with counterparties in financing and investment 
operations.
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assets drives down their prices yet further and 
exacerbates the credit crunch (Financial Stability 
Forum, 2008; Bazinger, 2008; Rochet, 2008; Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, 2008). These 
proposals could entail certain costs for the financial 
industry (higher capital requirements, for example) and 
a reduction in its capacity to use short-term resources to 
finance long-term ventures. Nonetheless, a more stable 
financial system makes a very important contribution 
to development. As eclac has pointed out on many 
occasions, economic variability is one of the main 
factors behind the low growth that characterized the 
region for a number of years.
3. Extending the scope of regulation and 
reliable risk disclosure
As already noted, one of the causes of the present 
crisis lies in inadequate disclosure of  banks’ risk 
exposures and the avoidance of regulation by means 
of  off-balance-sheet operations. Thus, one of  the 
lessons that can be learnt is precisely the need for 
banks to reveal their exposure to the risks entailed in 
these operations and for regulation to extend to any 
institution with systemic risk potential.
There is a need to determine the extent to 
which banking institutions in Latin America and the 
Caribbean are actually revealing their risk exposure, 
for both on- and off-balance-sheet operations. As 
pointed out earlier, periodic reporting of portfolio 
risk information is, a priori, inadequate in the region. 
Indeed, the practice of publishing periodic indicators 
of average bank portfolio risk (such as levels of arrears 
and weighted portfolio risk) is still not sufficiently 
widespread, even though this is considered indispensable 
if  depositors are to be properly informed about the 
risks they are taking on, thus reducing the implicit 
State guarantee.
In a number of  countries, again, financial 
development has been accompanied by the appearance 
of new intermediaries that have helped improve the 
efficiency of the system, but that bring new risks. Thus, 
there are now institutions that carry out financial 
investments, manage third-party portfolios or both. 
These investment companies sometimes carry out 
public securities offerings, whereupon they become 
subject to regulation by the authority responsible for 
this area. In other cases their funding does not rely 
on resources raised from the public, so that they are 
regulated very lightly or not at all on the basis that 
there is no implicit public guarantee. Nonetheless, 
the present crisis in the United States has provided 
dramatic examples of  cases where failures in the 
supervision of some of these institutions after they 
had grown large enough to pose potential systemic 
risks worsened the situation yet further.
Like developed countries, the region has seen the 
emergence of lending institutions in unregulated areas 
that have grown large enough to become a source of 
systemic risk. This is the case with credit cards issued 
by department stores and supermarkets (which are 
not defined as financial institutions), as these have 
become a very major source of credit, particularly for 
lower-income segments. These institutions basically 
operate as intermediaries for credit lines obtained 
from banks, but in some cases they also tap local and 
external capital markets directly for funding via bond 
issues. The amount of credit issued by them directly 
does not fully reflect their systemic risk, since their 
main instrument, the credit card, also tends to be 
used as a medium of payment in numerous businesses 
of significantly smaller size. Being retailers, they are 
usually not covered by financial regulation or subject 
to special capital or liquidity requirements.
Although their lending is spread among a large 
number of customers, the portfolio quality of these 
retailers could be seriously affected during a recessionary 
episode. This is because of the large proportion of 
vulnerable borrowers who systematically suffer more 
from negative fluctuations in economic activity. In 
this case, having a large number of borrowers is not 
necessarily equivalent to risk diversification, given the 
correlations that exist in the payment capacity of the 
groups most exposed to variations in the cycle.
In summary, the large scale of this type of lending 
today means that the systemic effects of bankruptcies 
among institutions of this type are not minor and can 
affect the capital of lending banks and holders of the 
paper (short-term securities and bonds) issued by 
them, although not necessarily the saving public, as 
they are not usually deposit-takers. The risk centres 
in this case on the possibility of an interruption in 
the payments chain, which is more serious the more 
widely used this instrument is as a payment method. 
This could lead to a liquidity crisis whose effects might 
spread to the rest of the system and trigger systemic 
repercussions.24
24 This danger has been recognized in Chile, where certain rules have 
been introduced to regulate the lending operations of department 
stores and supermarkets. The different nature of these institutions 
means that two types of rules have been introduced, depending on 
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Similarly, savings and loan cooperatives have grown 
large enough in some cases to generate systemic effects, 
although they would be smaller than those resulting 
from the failure of a largish bank. Nonetheless, the 
consequences in such cases are usually felt by low-
income groups, which typically account for a larger 
share of deposits in such institutions, or in certain cities 
or regions where the penetration of the banking system 
is lower, and by certain groups in similar categories 
(agriculture, dairy farming, saving for home ownership, 
etc.). Traditionally, these financial activities have been 
much more lightly regulated and bankruptcies have 
resulted in losses for the groups referred to and in 
unplanned use of public resources.25
The objections raised to increased regulation for 
institutions of this type are largely based on the fact 
that these sources of credit are often the only ones 
available to lower-income groups and that liquidity 
rules and capital requirements would make them 
more costly, thereby denying these people access to 
credit. However, these costs need to be compared with 
the negative effects that a crisis, whether systemic or 
confined to particular regions or activities, could have 
for the whole economy and for lower-income groups 
in particular.
Lastly, continuing with the subject of  reliable 
disclosure of risk exposures as one of the main measures 
for preventing systemic crisis, consolidated oversight 
of financial conglomerates is at a very incipient stage 
in the region. Thus, it is not possible to state banks’ 
degree of exposure to the risks of firms (financial and 
non-financial) that are members of a holding company. 
Likewise, there are few cooperation agreements between 
different regulatory agencies (for banks, insurers and 
limited-liability companies), so that the supervisory 
authority does not have an overview of the systemic 
risk posed by a particular financial institution.
the total volume of credit granted, so that the smallest have been left 
unregulated. For medium-sized lenders, liquidity requirements only 
have been established, as the systemic risk they pose is considered 
to be small but not insignificant. Capital requirements have been 
introduced in addition for larger institutions, although they are 
significantly less onerous than those imposed on banks.
25 A recent example of  the risk represented by unregulated 
financial intermediation activities is provided by the collapse of 
various “pyramids” in Colombia during the second half  of 2008. 
The crises at these informal saving institutions resulted in losses 
for lower-income groups, social unrest and public intervention to 
moderate the impact on these groups. During the liberalization of 
the financial system in Chile in the 1970s, appropriate regulation 
and oversight were lacking and informal financing institutions also 
emerged and then went bankrupt (Held and Szalachman, 1989; 
Held and Jiménez, 1999).
4. Conflicts of interest associated with risk 
assessment
As already stated, shortcomings in the way credit risk 
is dealt with form an essential part of the explanation 
for the current financial crisis in developed countries. 
Deficiencies in these areas have combined with 
lax regulation and changes in the financial system 
to generate inappropriate incentives where risk is 
concerned. Although, as already mentioned, the nature 
of the region’s financial systems is quite different from 
that of  the developed countries’, there are certain 
common features that have the potential to lead to 
a weakening of risk monitoring by the supervisory 
authorities in less sophisticated systems.
First, there is a clear conflict of interest for rating 
agencies when these not only help to structure financial 
instruments, but also have to express an opinion on 
their credit quality. The same is true of the role played 
by external auditors, which usually provide a range of 
services to financial institutions, with obvious conflicts 
of interest sometimes arising when they come to express 
their views on their financial statements.
It was the acknowledgement of these conflicts 
following the crises of major conglomerates in the 
United States during the early years of the present 
decade, leading among other things to the disappearance 
of one of the big four global auditing firms, that gave 
rise to the Sarbanes-Oxley law. The thrust of this was 
to make external auditing firms independent of their 
clients by limiting the functions they could perform 
vis-à-vis a given firm or group of related firms and by 
setting limits on how important, commercially speaking, 
any one client could be to a given auditing firm.
In Latin America and the Caribbean, the lessons 
from these crises have not been incorporated into 
regulations governing the role of risk rating agencies 
and external audit firms. Furthermore, the region 
has fallen behind in the way it treats transactions 
between firms with links of  ownership or kinship 
between their owners and leading executives. Given 
the small size of some economies, then, there is still 
the potential for the conflict of interest that arises 
when there is a relationship of  one of  these two 
kinds between a financial institution and the firms 
that should be providing an independent opinion on 
its financial statements or assessing the risk level of 
a financial security.
Secondly, it has recently been proposed in the 
context of the Basel II Accord that banks’ internal 
methods should play a more important role in 
21
FinAnCiAL rEGuLAtion AnD ovErsiGht: LEssons FroM thE Crisis For LAtin AMEriCA 
AnD thE CARIBBEAn  •  FILIPA CoRREIA, LuIs FELIPE JIMénEz AnD sAnDRA MAnuELIto
C E P A L  R E V I E W  9 9  •  D E C E M B E R  2 0 0 9
determining the risk characteristics of  particular 
instruments in order to establish capital requirements 
and provisions. In the light of recent experience, this is 
clearly a field where conflicts of interest are acute and 
the systemic consequences can be very severe, so the 
opinion of private agents should not be exclusively relied 
upon. Proper rating of the risks of new and increasingly 
complex financial instruments will thus require major 
investment to improve the technical capabilities of 
those supervising the region’s systems.
IV
Conclusions
More than a year on from the outbreak of the current 
financial crisis in the United States, its causes are 
starting to become abundantly clear. Analysis of 
these causes shows that, contrary to the claims of 
market optimists, the financial markets suffer from 
serious failings of self-regulation. This is explained by 
the role played by expectations about future returns, 
serious information asymmetries and failures and 
moral hazard, conflicts of  interest and inadequate 
governance, as a result of which financial markets are 
prone to unsustainable equilibria and to “manias and 
panics” that can lead to systemic crises.
The current crisis has also brought to light some 
major fallacies of composition underlying an approach 
to the operation of financial markets that fails to take 
account of the systemic aspects of market liquidity 
and risk. It is precisely on the basis of these systemic 
and procyclical characteristics that financial system 
regulation is now undergoing a major reformulation.
Although the region’s financial systems differ 
significantly from those of more developed countries, 
a number of lessons from this debate, appropriately 
adapted, are also germane to the effort to create better 
regulatory frameworks and public policy management 
in the region.
This article has emphasized lessons that can be 
learned in the sphere of financial system regulation, 
but this does not detract from the importance of 
macroeconomic measures to prevent financial crises 
and enhance the ability of economies to cope with 
them. Many of the financial crises experienced in Latin 
American and Caribbean countries can be traced back 
to the implementation of  macroeconomic policies 
that were inconsistent or encouraged overborrowing, 
or both. Nonetheless, regulatory failures and the 
procyclical and systemic characteristics of the financial 
system played their part in aggravating imbalances and 
heightening their effects when these problems arose.
The lessons for financial regulation in the region 
from the current crisis so far relate to internal regulatory 
aspects and fall into four main groups: (i) the need 
for a macroprudential approach to supplement the 
current regulatory approach, (ii) the need to design 
mechanisms that can reduce the procyclicality of 
financial systems, (iii) extension of  the traditional 
scope of regulation and oversight to any institution 
that poses systemic risks, and (iv) certain aspects of 
the relationship between risk rating agencies, external 
auditing firms and financial institutions that result in 
faulty handling of risk.26
Intensive debate is going on in all these areas, 
but analysis is only just beginning in Latin America 
and the Caribbean. Given the severe economic and 
social effects that have stemmed from the present crisis, 
there is an increasingly compelling need to review the 
situation of the region in the areas discussed here.
(Original: Spanish)
26 The issue of how to handle a crisis once it has begun are part 
of another discussion that is not broached here.
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